The Creation of the Multilateral Trade Court: Design and Experiential Learning by Elsig, Manfred & Eckhardt, Jappe
The Creation of theMultilateral Trade Court:
Design and Experiential Learning
MANFRED ELS IG*
World Trade Institute, University of Bern
JAPPE ECKHARDT**
Simon Fraser University
Abstract: The creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO)’s dispute
settlement system (DSS) in 1995 remains one of the most puzzling outcomes in
international politics and international law in the 1990s. We provide a new
explanation for this move to law. We argue that important contextual variables
of the negotiations have been largely overlooked by existing explanations, namely
‘experiential learning’. While negotiations to create institutions are characterized
by uncertainty about distributional effects, negotiators will look for clues that
moderate uncertainty. In the context of the Uruguay Round negotiations, a
significant amount of information was drawn from actual practice and experience
with the existing General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) dispute
settlement system. In short, experience gained with judicial institutions and
outcomes is important to understand the key results of the negotiations: a
legalization leap, more specifically a judicialization of the existing dispute
settlement system. We focus on the two dominant actors in the negotiations (the
United States and the (then) European Community) and provide evidence for our
argument based on an analysis of GATT cases in the 1980s, GATT documents,
and in-depth interviews with negotiators who participated in the negotiations.
1. Introduction
The Dispute Settlement System (DSS) of the World Trade Organization (WTO) is
widely seen as the key pillar of the multilateral trading system. This unique system
for settling trade disputes through judicial processes was put in place in 1995 with
the establishment of the WTO as an international organization. The WTO’s prede-
cessor, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), also had a procedure
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for settling disputes, but it suffered from several serious shortcomings. During the
Uruguay Round, GATT contacting parties agreed to redesign dispute settlement in
several ways in order to rectify these shortcomings. The reform was significant.
The new system has been called the ‘jewel in the crown’ of the WTO and has led
to a vast body of literature. Much attention has been paid in this regard to why, and
under what circumstances, countries initiate disputes (Bown, 2005; Horn et al.,
1999), which countries are the most and least active initiators or targets of WTO
disputes (Horn et al., 2011), and how legal capacity, economic stakes, and
power relations influence the prospects of litigation (Kim, 2008; Sattler and
Bernauer, 2011; Elsig and Stucki, 2012). Others have looked at what type of dis-
putes escalate and, hence, move on from the consultation stage to the panel stage
and beyond (Guzmann and Simmons, 2002), which countries are most likely to
win claims they have made before panels (Hoekman et al., 2009), what role
third parties play in WTO disputes (Bown, 2005; Busch and Reinhardt, 2006),
and how private actors are involved in WTO litigation (see Shaffer, 2003;
Eckhardt and De Bièvre, 2015). Finally, questions on economic effects (Bown,
2004) and on authority of the court-like system (Shaffer et al., forthcoming)
have been addressed.
What is lacking so far, however, are studies that explain the origins of this sig-
nificant legalization leap, in particular the introduction of judicial processes. This
extraordinary move to law was not anticipated at the outset of the negotiations
by any GATT expert. Given the importance of the court today, it is still puzzling
how little research has been conducted on the design of the WTO DSS. The
work that does exist is United States (US) focused and suggests that one (or a com-
bination) of the following factors explains the creation of the DSS: (a) a move by US
negotiators in an attempt to tie Congress’s hands (Thompson, 2007); (b) the desire
of the US to improve the legitimacy of the system (Pelc, 2010; Goldstein and Gowa,
2002); or (c) simply to help enforce rules that reflect US objectives (Goldstein and
Steinberg, 2008).
In this article, we attempt to overcome this US bias by also looking at the crucial
role of the European Community (EC). In addition, we provide an explanation that
departs from the usual accounts in the tradition of the rational design (RD) research
programme (Koremenos et al., 2001). Like others before us, we suggest that the RD
literature has not sufficiently taken into account the context in which negotiations
took place. Building on the concept of ‘experiential learning’, we argue that the
interpretations of the GATT dispute settlement system of the time, and of
ongoing disputes, significantly conditioned the preferences of the actors involved
in the negotiations. Negotiators take into account past behavior within a given
institution when assessing whether they will be on the winning or losing side
when rules change. Empirically, we show how experiential learning has affected
the positions of both the US and the EC. In the case of the US, the proposals of
the early negotiations phase were characterized by US negotiators’ discontent
with the situation in which other parties (in particular the EC) were often able to
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block the establishment of panels. US negotiators also embraced a judicial system
because they anticipated that few parties would bring cases against the US. In com-
parison, at the beginning of the negotiation process, the EC was pursuing a laggard
approach. However, the outcomes of the disputes that arose during the period of
the negotiations (under the GATT dispute settlement provisions existing at that
time) led the EC to change its overall approach to the negotiations from that of a
reluctant actor favoring non-judicial means of dispute settlement to that of a sup-
porter of the new system. This preference shift proved important for the reforms
that occurred. Finally, the article, as part of a special issue on ‘Judicial Politics in
International Trade Relations’ (De Bièvre and Poletti, 2015), aims to further our
knowledge on judicialization of international trade relations in general and in
the WTO in particular (see also Poletti et al., 2015).
We structure this article as follows. The next section outlines the argument as to
how experiential learning affects the design of judicial institutions in the multilat-
eral trade organization. Section 3 provides empirical evidence for our argument.
Based on an analysis of GATT cases, interviews, and negotiation documents, we
illustrate the development of US and EC positions over time and the key role experi-
ential learning played in this process. Section 4 discusses the results and concludes.
2. Experiential learning and trade negotiations
The literature on the design of international institutions has suggested that uncer-
tainty is an important explanation for treaty design in general (Koremenos et al.,
2001; see also Koremenos, 2005) and for trade agreements in particular
(Rosendorff and Milner, 2001; Rosendorff, 2005). Whereas the literature works
with different types and forms of uncertainty, explanations boil down to the lack
of sufficient knowledge about the future distribution of gains from cooperation.
The RD literature has been helpful in advancing research on explaining design
differences across international institutions and has offered testable conjectures
on how uncertainty drives design. However, it has suffered from two blind spots.
The first relates to the role of negotiations. The RD literature has not addressed
the question of how negotiations can alter positions and eventually preferences
within its (static) framework. Negotiation-related dynamics may lead to different
outcomes than those predicted by RD. The second concerns the context of nego-
tiations and in particular the fact that many institutions are not created from
scratch, but usually build upon existing institutions. That is, new institutions are
designed with existing knowledge about past practices and experiences.
We are certainly not the first to observe that not controlling for contextual vari-
ables biases research on design choices. In a recent article, Copelovitch and Putnam
(2014) have convincingly argued that the institutional context plays a key role (i.e.
‘has an independent influence’) in the strategic decisions of actors on the design of
international agreements. The authors point in particular to the importance of ‘the
presence or absence of existing and prior agreements between prospective partners
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in “new” cooperation’ (Copelovitch and Putnam, 2014: 471). That is, according to
Copelovitch and Putnam (2014: 484), ‘more extensive present and past cooperation
may ameliorate (or exacerbate) states’ concerns about cheating by their counterparts
… [as it] mediates uncertainty over the preferences of negotiating partners by offering
information about prior commitments and the incentives those commitments create’.
Although they convincingly show that past cooperation independently affects out-
comes by using different contextual proxies, there is a need to deepen the analysis
on the type contextual factors and the causal mechanisms at work.
Building on some of the insights from the RD literature, and the aforementioned
observations by Copelovitch and Putnam (2014), we develop an argument as to
how context affected the design outcomes of the WTO DSS. Our first step is to
define what the context is in our case. The context under scrutiny is the preexisting
GATT dispute settlement system and the outcomes it produced.1 The next question
we need to address is how experience with the GATT system affected the design of
the newWTODSS after we have controlled for other factors. Based on the assump-
tion that a key element in negotiations is uncertainty and that actors look for infor-
mation to address uncertainty, we argue that clues from actual behavior are a
proxy for negotiators in forming their expectations about a future system.
Forming expectations takes place through what is known as ‘learning’ from the
outputs of the current system. The idea that learning shapes preferences of actors
is well established in psychology (Kolb, 1984), as well as in business studies
(Delios and Henisz, 2003; Tsang, 1999). Political scientist and international
relations scholars increasingly pay attention to the concept of learning as well.
For instance, within the literature on historical institutionalism, there is a wide-
ranging debate on the circumstances under which historically formed institutions
transform over time. One way through which institutional change can occur is
when the actors involved go through a process of ‘strategic learning’ – i.e. assimi-
late new information and revise their perception on the functioning of the insti-
tution in question – and alter the institutional environment in which they operate
(Hay and Wincott, 1998). Learning also plays an important role in the literature
on policy diffusion. For example, there is a large body of literature which argues
that the spread of liberal policies (e.g. tariff reductions, protection of minority
rights, and privatization) across the globe since the end of the twentieth century,
is the result of policy makers learning from their own (domestic) experience with
liberalization, as well as from policy experiments elsewhere (for an overview of
this literature see Dobbin et al., 2007).
Most of the literature assumes that learning happens when (new) information
changes the beliefs of actors (whether individuals or firms) about cause and
1 In this article, we do not focus on external context variables such as the Cold War. We treat geopo-
litical and systemic variables as constant. No empirical work so far has found any notable effect of the end
of the Cold War on negotiations on the design of GATT dispute settlement.
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effect (Levy, 1994; Elkins and Simmons, 2005).2Whereas various forms of learning
are described, for the purpose of our argument, we suggest focusing on experiential
learning, a type of Bayesian learning or updating. ‘Bayesian learning takes place as
new data consistent with a hypothesized relationship accumulate, or fail to. As
information accumulates, some hypotheses are discarded and others are reinforced.
The more consistent the evidence, the more likely [actors] will converge on a
narrow range of interpretations’ (Dobbin et al., 2007: 460). Information (data)
can come from previous experience or from interaction and observation (Huth
and Russett, 1984; Powell, 1988). If information originates from actors’ own
past experience, we use the term ‘experiential learning’. As Delios and Henisz
(2003: 1154) write with respect to international investment decisions by firms:
‘Experience in a host country, for example, provides important information
about its business environment thereby reducing uncertainty, and enabling a firm
to make a better evaluation of potential future expansions. Investment experience
broadens a firm’s perception of its alternatives and increases the extent of its
search.’We expect a similar process to take place in the context of the institutional
design choice of (treaty) negotiators. In the end, past experience may lead not only
to the adjustment and modification of strategies in negotiations, but may also lead
to a change in preferences.3
Moving to the world of trade negotiations in the context of the Uruguay Round,
we assume that the more negotiators expect to gain from an institutional change,
the more likely they are to advocate a move away from the status quo.
Alternatively, negotiators who fear negative distributional consequences from
dispute rulings will be reluctant to agree on a reform. Building on the concept of
‘experiential learning’, we ask what types of clues do treaty negotiators rely
upon that affect learning, eventual adaptations of positions, or even a shift in pre-
ferences? We expect negotiators to look in particular at the past and existing usage
of the GATT dispute settlement system and to learn from the outcomes of cases
their countries have been party to. The information they draw upon will in turn
condition their positions in current negotiations. Our expectation is that negotia-
tors focus in particular on both overall success (countries’ wins and losses when
2 In this sense, learning is different from adaptation, as the latter means that actors simply adapt to
shifts in behavior or to changing preferences of others (Elkins and Simmons, 2005). It is also different
from (rational) anticipation, as this means that actors anticipate solely on the basis of the actions and pos-
itions of other actors and adjust their behavior in order to maximize their own net benefits (for a discussion
see Keohane, 2001). Our focus on experiential learning is also different from research on general repu-
tation, which is very much a question of trust vis-à-vis other actors (Tomz, 2007). Trust shapes the
general environment in which negotiations take place. Finally, experiential learning also needs to be con-
ceptually disentangled from what negotiation theorists call internal dynamics of the negotiations which
focus on endogenous change spurred on by socialization effects or external shocks (Downie, 2012).
3 It is important to note in this regard that the concept of experiential learning we use is different from
the strict usage of (Bayesian) learning and updating in most of the game-theoretical literature. In game
theory, preferences are stable and actors will only use (updated) information to alter (negotiation) strategies
(for a discussion see Checkel, 2001).
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engaged in disputes) and lessons learned in specific disputes. Based on this experi-
ence, negotiators periodically update the information received and if their assess-
ment of the distributional consequences changes (experiential learning), this can
lead to a change of strategies, or can go as far as preference shifts.
We illustrate shifting negotiation strategies in the context of the Uruguay Round
negotiations on dispute settlement with an example drawn from South Korea. As
South Korea faced legal complaints in the mid-1980s, it was reluctant to engage
in a move away from the status quo. In order to play a constructive role, early
on in the negotiations it supported an enhanced role of mediation within dispute
settlement processes and the introduction of non-compulsory arbitration pro-
cedures.4 This reflected the concern about losing the blocking power when
moving to a more legalized system. Over time, when automaticity and more stream-
lined processes for implementation became more widely accepted during the nego-
tiations, South Korean negotiators modified their bargaining strategy and
suggested that when adopting a panel report and defining a reasonable time
frame for implementation, the Council should take into consideration political,
economic, and social factors. This was an attempt to allow some flexibility in imple-
menting the reports’ recommendations in the future based on experience at the
time. While engaged in these negotiations South Korea faced three cases concerning
beef imports, where, for domestic political reasons, it needed more time for
implementation.5 In sum, South Korea’s changing submissions at the different
stages of the negotiations could not be understood without analyzing the cases in
which it was concurrently involved.
3. The creation of the WTO’s dispute settlement system: a case of experiential
learning?
In the empirical section, for simplicity, we focus on the two leading actors in the
system: the US and the EC. They were the major trade powers at the time. Given
the nature of multilateral trade negotiations in the 1980s, the US and EC preferences
needed to overlap in order for a move away from the status quo to occur. In addition,
the US and the EC were by far the most active participants in the GATT Dispute
Settlement system, both as initiators and as targets. When looking at the 1950–
1989 period, the EC and the US were involved (as the defendant and/or the complai-
nant) in 190 of all 207 cases filed (Hudec, 1993). This explains why dispute settle-
ment design was a salient issue for both of these GATT contracting parties.
We first provide an overview of the reforms that were agreed and discuss how
these came as a surprise to many of the Geneva-based diplomats. Second, we
4MTN.GNG/NG13/W/19, 20 November 1987.
5 Internal Memorandum from GATT Secretariat to the Director-General on Korea, 3 November 1989
(AL/gm), on file with author.
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discuss the cases in which the US and EC were involved in the 1980s and which
informed and shaped the negotiators’ ‘experiential learning’. Third, we provide
evidence based on archival research and in-depth interviews with participating
negotiators by tracing the effects of disputes that occurred during the time of the
negotiations.
3.1 From GATT to the WTO – embracing judicialization
The early GATT era was characterized by an anti-legal attitude. Disputes were
solved through diplomatic–political processes. Over time, some forms of low-
level legalization occurred with the introduction of panels composed of indepen-
dent experts. However, the system suffered from parties’ blocking power, which
could be exerted on multiple occasions. Dispute settlement decisions were taken
on the basis of a ‘positive consensus’, i.e. there had to be no objection from any
member to the decision. As a result, individual GATT contracting parties
(especially defendants such as the EC and Japan) had de facto veto power over
the establishment of panels, the approval of panel reports, and the authorization
of retaliation, which meant that many cases dragged on for a long time without
a decision being taken. Therefore complainants (most notably the US) frustrated
with the slow decision-making procedures, often decided unilaterally to impose
trade sanctions without the approval of the GATT (Bernauer et al., 2012).
When, in the early 1980s, the preparations for the Uruguay Round negotiations
began, many parties therefore considered that the DSS based on the 1979
Understanding was not working well.6 Nevertheless, the originally intended
reforms were rather general. In a GATT Council Meeting held in 1982, a draft
text by the Preparatory Committee chaired by the Canadian Ambassador was dis-
cussed. This document called for ‘improvement in the operation of the dispute
settlement procedures based on more constructive consultation, greater recourse
to conciliation and the more effective resolution of disputes at the multilateral
level without creating a situation of “impasse”’.7 The Ministerial Declaration
was even less ambitious stating that the 1979 Understanding should remain ‘the
essential framework of procedures for the settlement of disputes’.8 No significant
change was needed but ‘there (was) scope for more effective use of the existing
mechanism and for specific improvements in procedures’.9 Finally, it was stressed
that ‘obstruction in the process of dispute settlement shall be avoided’.10
In the run-up to the Uruguay Round negotiations, the Director-General of the
GATT commissioned an external panel of experts to draw up a list of issues that
6 For the 1979 Tokyo Round Dispute Settlement Understanding, see http://www.worldtradelaw.net/
tokyoround/1979understanding.pdf (accessed 8 May 2014).
7 Preparatory Committee, GATT Doc. L/5395, 26 October 1982.
8Ministerial Declaration, GATT Doc. L/5424, 29 November 1982.
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid.
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needed to be addressed by the new trade round. In relation to dispute settlement,
this report referred to some of the procedural problems, such as the need to
speed up the process and the composition of panels (e.g., panelists should be
experts on the GATT legal system). It mentioned moreover that panels should
clearly indicate the rationale for decisions, and it focused, among other issues, on
the Director-General’s role in mediation and conciliation and more systematic
implementation of panel reports. Yet it also abstained from formulating more con-
crete proposals. The 1986 ministerial conference launching the Uruguay Trade
Round described the objective in the area of settling disputes as being ‘to
improve and strengthen the rules and the procedures … while recognizing the con-
tribution by more effective and enforceable GATT rules and disciplines … nego-
tiations shall include the development of adequate arrangements for overseeing
and monitoring of the procedures that would facilitate compliance with adopted
recommendations’.11 The negotiations on dispute settlement started in 1987 and
key issues were agreed by 1992. In 1993, negotiators presented the
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes
(DSU), which came into effect with the creation of the WTO in 1995.
The key changes to the old system were, first, that the veto power held by defen-
dants at the commencement of the process was eliminated by granting complai-
nants the right to a panel;12 second, by the introduction of ‘negative consensus’
decision-making for the adoption of panels, Appellate Body (AB) reports, and
the authorization of countermeasures a type of automaticity was introduced;13
third, with the agreement to create an appeal institution (the AB) a court-like
body was established, which received considerable authority. Finally, it was
agreed that states should abstain from taking unilateral actions.
Most of these outcomes were surprising. Interviews with former GATT officials
who closely followed the negotiations suggest that neither automaticity nor the cre-
ation of the AB could have been foreseen at the beginning of the negotiations.14
One official put it as follows in relation to the AB: ‘I couldn’t believe it myself.
Why had the US accepted the creation of the Appellate Body?’15
3.2 EC and US experience with GATT dispute settlement in the 1980s
In line with our argument that practices with existing rules and past and ongoing
disputes provide negotiators with clues about how to address existing uncertainty,
we focus on both the EC and US experience as defendants and as complainants
11Draft Ministerial Declaration, MIN(86)/W/19, 20 September 1986.
12 This reform was provisionally applied as of 1989. See ‘Decision on Improvements to the GATT
Dispute Settlement Rules and Procedures’, GATT Doc. BISD 36S/62, 12 April 1989.
13 See: http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/disp_settlement_cbt_e/c3s1p1_e.htm.
14 Interviews: former senior GATT official, 29 June 2009; former GATT official, 24 April 2008.
15 Interview former GATT official, 24 April 2008.
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during the time of negotiations. We rely on a database compiled by Hudec et al.
(1993; see also Hudec, 1993).
3.2.1 EC and US as defendants
When comparing the role of the two trading blocs as defendants, we compare the
overall number of cases brought against them and provide descriptive evidence on
the different litigation outcomes. Table 1 provides an overview of these outcomes
by showing the total number of complaints brought against the EC and the US;
the number of cases that were withdrawn by the complainant before a settlement
or ruling was reached; the number of cases settled; and, for those cases that ended
up in a legal ruling, the number of cases won and lost by both parties. Finally, we
provide information on the compliance record of the EC and the USwith lost rulings.
Even though Table 1 shows that the EC and the US were targeted more or less
equally and that the number of cases that received a ruling was the same, there
are some striking differences between the two. The US had a much lower percen-
tage of settled cases (8%) than the EC (25%). When compared to the average per-
centage of all GATT cases that were settled (32%), the low number of US disputes
settled becomes even more striking. In addition, 20 out of a total of 38 (i.e. 53%) of
all cases brought against the US were withdrawn, while withdrawal took place in
‘only’ 33%16 of all cases in which the EC was the defendant. In other words, as
Hudec et al. (1993: 37) put it, ‘[t]he United States emerges as an unruly defendant
that is difficult to bring into court’. The US was not too concerned being targeted as
the percentage of cases it won was relatively high and complainants would often
withdraw their claims.
Next we turn to the substantive outcomes of cases that eventually received a legal
ruling. In this respect, it is important to note that at that time it was not very likely
that a defendantwouldwin a case. In the 1980s, the chance ofwinning as adefendant
was about 15%. In other words, in 85% of the cases the violation complaint filed
Table 1. EC and US as defendants (1980–1989)
Total complaints Withdrawn Settled
Ruled
Won
Lost
Compliance Non-compliance
EC 36 12 9 1 13 1
US 38 20 3 5 6 4
Source: Hudec et al. (1993).
16 A withdrawal rate of 33% was more or less the average for all GATT members.
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against the defendantwas granted (Hudec et al., 1993). TheUSwas a clear outlier, as
it won five out of 15 (i.e. 33%) of its cases as defendant. This relatively high percen-
tage of rulings in favor of the US is evenmore significant if one takes into account the
aforementioned fact that the US settled very few cases and that many cases against
the US were withdrawn before they were even brought to ‘court’. By contrast, the
EC figures were below the average of all GATT countries, as only one (or 8%) of
all cases filed against the EC resulted in a legal victory for the EC. These numbers
suggest that the US was well able to use legal reasoning to defend cases brought
against it, while the EC’s record as a defendant in disputes was less positive.
A final aspect worth mentioning is how the two parties responded to legal rulings
against them (i.e. the ruled cases that were lost by either the EC or the US in Table 1).
We distinguish between compliance and non-compliance in this regard. Compliance
means that ‘the legal claim has been fully (or almost fully) vindicated [by the defen-
dant], usually by removing a measure found to be in violation of GATT’. Non-com-
pliance outcome cases are those ‘in which the legal system has failed to enforce a
valid claim’ (Hudec, 1993: 276). Table 1 shows that the EC was much more
willing than the US to accept the rulings of the GATT dispute settlement process.
In 13 out of 14 lost cases (i.e. 92%), the EC complied with the decision taken,
while the US complied in only six out of 10 cases (i.e. 60%). In other words, in
40% of the cases the US ignored the legal ruling and did not change its policy.
The US clearly felt less obliged to comply with international law than the EC did.
3.2.2 EC and US as complainants
Next, we discuss the role of the EC and the US as complainants in the 1980s (see
Table 2 for a summary). When looking at the total number of cases brought we
find that the USwas definitely more active than the EC (39 and 26 cases respectively).
If we focus on the outcomes, an even more interesting distinction becomes apparent.
In disputes involving the US, 85%of all cases ended in either a legal ruling (41%) or a
settlement (44%). Only six out of 39 (i.e. 15%) cases were withdrawn by the US,
which was far below the 39% GATT average for that period. The EC, on the
other hand, had a rather similar percentage to the US of cases that received a
ruling (46%), but it did not settle a single case and it withdrew more cases
(without waiting for a settlement or legal ruling) than any other GATT member at
that time: 14 out of 26 cases (54%). This suggests that the EC was not persuaded
that its own legal claims were valid and that the panel would rule in its favor.
Table 2 also shows the success rate of the EC and the US as complainants and,
again, the US was more successful than the EC. It is important to note, however,
that the differences here are definitely less significant than when they acted as defen-
dants. Of all cases that received a legal ruling, the US won 15 out of 16 cases (i.e.
94%). The EC, on the other hand, won ten out of 12 cases (i.e. 83%).
Finally, we look at how the losing defendants responded in cases that were
brought against them by the EC and the US. As Table 2 shows, countries were
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more likely to comply in cases brought by the US (93%) than those brought by the
EC (80%). The numbers for the EC are in line with the average of all GATT
countries (84% compliance rate), while the US again scores higher than average.
In sum, the US was more actively using the dispute settlement system than any
other GATT member, had a high likelihood of winning the cases in which it was
the complainant, was able to settle many cases both as complainant and defendant,
won relatively a high percentage of the cases in which it was the defendant and used
its powers when it deemed it necessary not to comply. When the US won cases in
which it was the complainant, the compliance rate was also extraordinarily high.
So, the US experience with the system, with the important exception of blocking
cases, was generally positive. Addressing multiple veto points in the process
would certainly have benefited the US, given the existing experience.
The EC by contrast had been much more reactive: when acting as a defendant it
settled many cases and for cases that reached a ruling, it lost nearly all of the claims
brought. In disputes in which it was the complainant, the EC withdrew many cases.
This points to the lack of a legal capacities and a critical stance towards dispute
settlement. Or as Hudec et al. (1993: 56) put it: ‘The Community had a rather pro-
nounced legal policy in this direction. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s the
Community was opposed to extensive use of the GATT DS procedure, fearing it
had more to lose than to gain from a litigation oriented approach to commercial
policy problems. Acting under this policy, the Community occasionally filed
GATT lawsuits as a defense device, a tit-for-tat reminder designed to discourage
complaints by others rather than an actual attempt to win legal victories. Once
the message was received, withdrawal of the complaint was often a more desirable
outcome for the EC than to strengthen GATT law by pursuing the complaint to a
ruling.’ Therefore, the EC was reluctant to engage in a reform of the DSS.
3.3 The US and EC approaches through the lenses of experiential learning
3.3.1 The US: Championing automaticity, accommodating the AB
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the US became increasingly frustrated by the fact
that many dispute settlement cases were not resolved (Stone Sweet, 1997). In
Table 2. EC and US as complainants (1980–1989)
Total complaints Withdrawn Settled
Ruled
Won
LostCompliance Non-compliance
EC 26 14 0 8 2 2
US 39 6 17 14 1 1
Source: Hudec et al. (1993).
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particular, the US was frustrated by a series of cases brought against the EC.
Problems with the EC, especially regarding its agricultural policy, had been at
the top of the US agenda during the Tokyo Round, and ‘no Tokyo Round legal
reforms could claim success without achieving some visible change in EC policy’
(Hudec, 1993: 145). Therefore, from 1980 on, the US was very active in filing com-
plaints against the EC, in the hope that doing so would force a change in EC policy.
All of these cases were aimed at what the EC regarded as vital elements of its
regional policy, in particular its Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). Both the US
and the EC realized that if these claims were to be successful, it would be impossible
for the EC to continue the CAP in its original form. So the stakes were high and the
EC fought the legal and political battle with all the means at its disposal. The EC’s
behavior strongly frustrated the US and turned out to be pivotal in fuelling the
desire of the US to change the GATT dispute settlement system.
Part of the problem, according to US trade policy-makers and experts, was that
panel reports were inadequate and/or GATT rules were unclear on some key issues.
Although this frustrated the US, there was one issue that led it to become even more
frustrated: the possibility of defendants to block cases (even after a panel ruling). In
particular, the EC, as a defendant in cases brought by the US, often blocked
the process. A series of cases brought against the EC in the 1980s – i.e. Pasta
(1981–1983); Canned Fruit (1982–1985), Citrus (1982–1985), and VAT
(1982–1984) – were particularly notable in this regard. In all these cases, the
panel ruled in favor of the US, but the EC did not accept its legal defeat and
blocked the adoption of the reports for a substantial period of time (Hudec,
1993: 202).17 Even though the US and the EC eventually settled some of the dis-
putes (e.g. the Pasta dispute), the US was not at all happy with the way the EC
had acted during these blocked cases. One US negotiator put it as follows: ‘the
EC was using tactics … Commission officials used to string out the process’.18
The frustration with the aforementioned cases was voiced in the US submission
to the DSU negotiations that started in 1987. The US argued that the ‘most obvious
problem is that some disputes have not been resolved, perhaps partly because of
inadequate panel reports or difficult rules in a few cases, but more often because
one or more parties have been unwilling to allow a resolution’.19 It pushed for a
speeding up of the processes and suggested binding arbitration.20While the US con-
tinued to use the legal venues aggressively at the start of the negotiations (see
Hudec, 1993: 203–208), it was the 1988 US Omnibus Trade Act in particular
that encouraged the US trade negotiators to continue to pursue and expand the
US’s unilateral approach to generate additional attacks on foreign trade barriers
(Hudec, 1993: 226–227). An EC negotiator remembered that the Omnibus Act
17 See for instance on the Pasta case Jackson (1997: 119).
18 Interview US negotiator (2), 4 November 2009.
19MTN.GNG/NG13/W/3, 22 April 1987.
20MTN.GNG/NG13/W/6, 25 June 1987.
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‘became an obsession with people’.21 The US responded to criticism by claiming
that it was forced to act unilaterally as the GATT was not strong enough, nor com-
prehensive enough, to do the job (Hudec, 1993: 230). This external event advanced
the US objective of addressing blockage in the GATT legal process.22 In 1989 the
negotiators agreed on provisionally applying the ‘right to a panel’ approach, under
which parties could no longer block the establishment of the panel. In addition,
more support for binding arbitration developed, while calls increased for taming
US unilateralism through an improved legal system (Elsig, 2014).
In 1990 and 1991 negotiators worked on providing checks on panel reports,
should these become binding. In this respect, two control tools for addressing the
issue of poor quality panel reports stand out. First, following the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) model, and with the support of the
US, an interim report stage was suggested, during which disputing parties would
receive a draft report and be provided with the opportunity to give input to
influence and correct the legal reasoning. Second, Canada suggested the ‘establish-
ment of a standing review tribunal’.23 This was the first attempt to link adoption of
reports with the possibility to appeal the legal reasoning of panels. The EC (as we
see below) was becoming increasingly supportive of such an additional mechanism
as the negotiations progressed. The US was less supportive of the idea; in particular,
the chief negotiator was worried about unnecessarily prolonging the implemen-
tation phase.24 Again, the US experience was that it won almost all of the cases
it brought; therefore it pushed for restricting the overall time frame. In addition,
the US negotiators wanted the time frames for compliance with rulings to be con-
sistent with the general time frames defined in the US Omnibus Act.25 This concern
was fully addressed by the negotiators of the DSU having defined strict time frames.
The US negotiators also stressed that appeals should only be about ‘extraordinary
cases where a panel report contains legal interpretations that are questionable’.26
The US negotiators’ expectation, shared by almost all negotiators, was that the
AB would be involved only in rare cases, an expectation that later turned out to
be false (Elsig, 2014). In the end, the US support for the AB was only lukewarm.
Reflecting on the negotiations, the chief US negotiator stressed the importance of
the overall experience with the existing system suggesting that: ‘there is an incur-
able tendency to fight the old war and rewrite this experience with new rules’.27
Other US negotiators also suggested that the chief negotiator ‘anticipated the US
21 Interview EC negotiator, 12 June 2009.
22 This external event led to adaptations in the sense that many GATT contracting parties reluctant to
move towards a more judicialized system started to soften their opposition. The US move strengthened pro-
posals aimed at a more streamlined and automatic system in general.
23MTN.GNG/NG13/17, 15 December 1989.
24 Interview Canadian negotiator, 15 July 2008.
25 Ibid.
26MTN.GNG/NG13/W/40.
27 Interview US negotiator (1), 4 November 2009.
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to be on the complainant side’, which helped push automaticity and acceptance of
the AB.28
3.3.2 The EC: from laggard on automaticity to a cheerleader for the AB
At the beginning of the negotiations to reform the dispute settlement mechanism of
the GATT, the EC was reluctant to play a pro-active role (Elsig, 2014). If disputes
arose, these were handled by officials from Directorate-General (DG) Trade and
DG Agriculture without any involvement of officials from the Legal Service of
the Commission.29 Given the experience with the existing system, the EC chief
negotiator was ready to make only minor changes. What the caseload suggested
was that the EC’s agricultural policy was a prominent target; this led to both
DG Agriculture and DG Trade taking a defensive stance at the beginning of the
negotiations.
A pivotal cause of concern to the EC was that many new cases could be brought
as so-called non-violation complaints. An EC negotiator recalled that ‘the agricul-
tural people [in the EC] were in particular afraid of non-violation cases’.30 To
understand non-violation complaints, one has to go back to the establishment of
the GATT in 1947. When the GATT negotiators had achieved substantial tariff
reductions among the GATT members, one of the biggest concerns was how to
make sure that the value of tariff reductions could be guaranteed. The idea was
to set up an advanced dispute settlement system (with the possibility to appeal)
within the framework of the proposed International Trade Organization (ITO).
As the ITO was never established – and hence a stringent dispute settlement
system did not see the light of day – the GATT drafters were very concerned that
contracting parties would take all kinds of actions to evade the binding tariff
reductions (Arnold, 1994; Cho, 1998). In response, those responsible for drafting
the GATT introduced the so-called non-violation provision. Article XXIII of the
GATT (1947), which was the primary source of GATT enforcement, was formu-
lated in such a way that a GATT member could claim that it faced losses (and
claim compensation) as a result of the imposition of a certain trade policy
measure by another member, even if that measure was not in violation of GATT
rules. As a result, as Arnold (1994: 195) put it, ‘[t]he GATT provide[d] a cause
of action both for violations of GATT obligations (“violation complaints”) and
for frustration of legitimate expectations of market access following tariff conces-
sions (“non-violation complaints”)’.
Throughout GATT history there have always been debates on whether the use of
non-violation cases should be kept to a minimum or should be more extensive.
Contracting parties involved in disputes have inconsistently (but naturally)
28 Interviews: US negotiator (2), 4 November 2009; Canadian negotiator, 15 July 2008.
29 Interview EC negotiator, 12 June 2009.
30 Interview with EC negotiator, 12 June 2009.
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defended either one of these two positions depending on their interests and their
position during a particular case. Overall, most GATT panel decisions ‘tried to
impose a certain amount of discipline on this vague provision by requiring that
the measure in dispute meet certain criteria before a non-violation case exists’
(Cho, 1998: 316). Yet there have also been several high-profile non-violation
cases in which the panel adopted a rather broad view on what a non-violation
case could be (Hudec, 1993). Given the ambiguity of the non-violation provision,
it is not surprising that it was a much-debated issue during the negotiations on the
DSU (Stewart, 1993).
A landmark non-violation case that significantly affected the EC’s position
during the negotiations was the EEC–Oilseed case.31 This case was brought by
the US in 1988 and was aimed at the EC’s scheme for subsidies on oilseeds.32
The origin of this case dates back to the beginning of the 1960s when, during
the GATT ‘Dillon Round’, the EC and the US struck a deal on reciprocal elimin-
ation of tariffs on oilseeds. However, over time, the EC established a regime of
price subsidization with the purpose of stimulating domestic production of oilseeds.
Although the subsidy was not in violation of the agreement on tariff elimination
signed at the beginning of the 1960s, the subsidy acted just like the tariff the EC
had promised to eliminate: from the beginning of the 1980s onwards, domestic
EC oilseed production increased sharply to the detriment of US exports. Some esti-
mates suggest that the value of US oilseed exports to the EC decreased by about US
$1 billion per year during the first half of the 1980s.33 The US repeatedly requested
the EC to remove its subsidies, but as the EC was not willing to change its subsidy
policy, the US finally decided to file a complaint against the EC in 1988 (Arnold,
1994; Hudec, 1993). At the stage of establishment of the panel, there was
already intense controversy. The French representative to GATT and the represen-
tative of DG Trade (Tran Van Thin) disagreed over the establishment of the
panel.34 It then took more than a year for the EC to agree upon the panel compo-
sition and the terms of reference. When the panel was finally established, it moved
fast. In December 1989 the panel submitted its report (for details see Hudec, 1993).
Although the EC had clearly lost the case, it dragged on for another three years. The
EC accepted the panel report, but it did not comply with the ruling. Later – after
angry protests by farmers in France, Germany, and Italy – the EC blocked
another panel report which assessed the (lack of) compliance (Arnold, 1994).
31European Economic Community – Payments and Subsidies Paid to Processors and Producers of
Oilseeds and Related Animal-Feed Proteins, BISD 37S/86 (EEC–Oilseeds).
32 “Oilseeds” is the collective name for whole, crushed, or broken soybeans, rape seeds, sunflower seeds
and oilcakes (Arnold 1994: 189).
33 See for instance remarks by then Deputy US Trade Representative Rufus H. Yerxa at the GATT
council meeting on EC oilseed subsidies on 4 November 1992 (quoted in Arnold, 1994: 189).
34 Interview EC negotiator, 12 June 2009.
The Creation of the Multilateral Trade Court s27
available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1474745615000130
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. Universitätsbibliothek Bern, on 29 Mar 2017 at 07:10:33, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use,
This case illustrates the EC’s insistence, based on case experience, that non-
violation complaints should be treated differently from other cases. However, the
case also substantially affected the EC position vis-à-vis legalization during the
Uruguay Round negotiations in an indirect way. One of the three experts in the
Oilseed case panel, Pierre Pescatore,35 felt ‘that the defense of the EC position
[during this case] was wrong and ridiculous’.36 Pescatore met with the President
of the Commission and various high officials from the several DGs, after which
understanding grew in Brussels that panels had become much more legalized and
that the lack of EC lawyers in disputes was working against the EC.37 In the
end, the Commission decided that for the purpose of litigation, the Legal Service
would take the lead, and a small litigation group within the Division ‘External
Relations and Trade’ was set up. At the same time, awareness was growing that
officials with legal expertise should support negotiators in Geneva.38 A principal
EC negotiator remembered that the EC ‘then also started to inject serious law
into its cases … this had some success. As I recall it, after losing the first banana
case [on the quota system for individual Member States that was then still in
force], we actually won a number of GATT cases, among which a procurement
case [based on the old Tokyo Round Procurement Code] and the first tuna case,
all against the US. This helped overcome much of the last resistance inside the
Commission (and perhaps also in someMember States) against the new judicialized
WTO system, since it showed that the Commission could hold its own in the legal
game, even against the US.’39
The first head of the litigation group also became actively involved in the nego-
tiations on the DSU although ‘resistance against lawyers was initially strong’, but
the ‘oilseed case in the end changed the balance between non-lawyers and
lawyers’.40 It further helped the transformation from a defensive to a more
active role in the negotiations, in particular supporting automaticity and the cre-
ation of the AB. While the EC position often appeared divided due to internal dis-
agreement over the increasing participation of lawyers in the EC team during the
negotiations, the EC moved toward accepting automaticity. However, it waited
until towards the end of the negotiations to officially concede and join the consen-
sus.41What is noteworthy is that the EC became actively involved in the discussions
on creating the AB and supported the creation of such a legalized body.
The EC’s acceptance of a move to law was greatly shaped by experiential learn-
ing spurred by an improving record in winning disputes towards the end of the
35 Pescatore was a very prominent and influential European Court of Justice judge.
36 Interview EC negotiator, 12 June 2009.
37 Interview EC negotiator, 10 April 2013.
38 Interview EC negotiator, 12 June 2009.
39 Interview EC negotiator, 10 April 2013.
40 Interview EC negotiator, 12 June 2009.
41 Interview EC negotiator, 12 June 2009.
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Round. An unintended process starting after the Oilseed case further changed the
perception in Brussels and led to the strengthening of legal advice and importantly
to greater participation of legal experts in the EC negotiation team. Thus, this
change of EC position was important to enable the move toward a consensual
agreement in the negotiations dominated by the US and the EC.42 However, the
support of the EC for legalization was conditional on finding a solution to the
issue of non-violation complaints and the EC dragged its heels on this issue until
the end of the negotiations.43 One US negotiator recalled the strong insistence on
this matter by the chief EC negotiator on the DSU: ‘He was a robot, he kept
on saying that the Commission could never give in … we spent so much time on
this, incredible.’44 Finally, it was agreed that non-violation complaints would
allow parties more control over the process, recommendations were not automati-
cally binding, and the focus was on finding mutually acceptable solutions in these
types of disputes (see Article XXVI DSU).
4. Discussion and conclusion
This article shows how, in negotiating judicial procedures and institutions, existing
experience with the current rules and case law affects the expectations and pos-
itions held by negotiators. These actors take into account past behavior within a
given institution and predict whether the contracting party they represent will be
on the winning side or the losing side when rules change. The case study provides
evidence of how context mattered when negotiating and agreeing on key changes to
the preexisting dispute settlement system of the GATT era. The evidence shows
how experiential learning, namely the preoccupation with old cases (e.g., US
cases being blocked and the EC losing cases) significantly shaped the stances
adopted at the beginning of the negotiations. The case study then provided evidence
on how expectations about the future prospects for legal cases (the US anticipating
a complainant role and the EC expecting to be confronted with non-violation com-
plaints) affected design outcomes. Finally, the analysis has traced the effect of a
landmark case (the Oilseed case) and has shown how this helped trigger a shift
in the EC’s position. This was further supported and consolidated by positive
experience in cases towards the end of the negotiations. Thus the article provides
empirical evidence for ‘the importance of prior institutional and legal commitments
in shaping states’ choices about the design features of new agreements’
(Copelovitch and Putnam, 2014: 488).
42 Interviews with negotiators who were involved provide no evidence that the US and EC engaged in a
formal consensus as such. Many proposals were developed within the QUAD (US/EC/Japan/Canada) and
other negotiation groups during the lengthy negotiation period (Elsig, 2014). Once the gradual shift on the
part of the EC occurred, the process for finding a consensus was greatly strengthened.
43 Internal Note by the GATT Secretariat, 13 June 1992 (AL/gm), on file with authors.
44 Interview US negotiator (2), 4 November 2009.
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In terms of the legalization leap towards judicial processes, the study shows that
the existing literature has not only paid little attention to the EC as one of two
main trading powers during the 1980s, but also that experiential learning is an
important concept for explaining a substantial part of the observed outcomes.
Purely US-based explanations lack explanatory power for this legalization leap.
First, there is little evidence that the US supported a move to law to tie
Congress’s hands. If it had done so, we should witness hand-tying strategies
after Congress passed the US Omnibus Act of 1988. However, this event did
not affect the US position as such. Rather, it led to some adaptations of the nego-
tiation positions taken by other contracting parties. It dampened the opposition
toward a move to law, creating discomfort among negotiators about the effects
a unilateral approach towards dispute settlement could have on the entire
system. Second, whereas the US negotiators were optimistic that the new and
updatedWTO rules were in its favor (Goldstein and Steinberg, 2008), the evidence
presented in this article suggests that existing practice and experience with cases
were equally, if not more, important for understanding the US position in the
negotiations.
What are the key observations that arise out of this study? First, negotiations on
judicial institutions are characterized by significant uncertainty, even when nego-
tiators use clues from past and current patterns. A US negotiator recalled that
‘there was a lot of uncertainty until the end what these procedures should be …
we had no factual basis what happens after panel … No one had any idea what
would happen’.45 This statement suggests that negotiations on procedures are
different from negotiations on substantive commitments in that uncertainty
might be a more important element in the former. Second, interview material
also suggests that the outcomes of negotiations on judicial institutions are
shaped by individual negotiators’ experience with different legal traditions (e.g.,
common law vs. civil law systems). This affects individual negotiators’ preferences
for certain procedural rules over others, depending on past experience gathered
within domestic legal settings. Future research could further investigate how differ-
ent domestic legal traditions affect design choices in dispute settlement provisions
at the international level. Finally, the study suggests that the composition of nego-
tiating teams matters, illustrated by the EC’s gradual shift of position during the
WTO DSS negotiations. It might be important for actors without past exposure
to the work of an existing institution to be invited to join the negotiating team.
Allowing ‘outsiders’ to join the group ensures that more information is considered
that is not filtered through past experience. In addition, such a decision may
temper one-sided approaches to ‘fighting old wars’.
45 Interview US Negotiator (2), 4 November 2009.
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